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ABSTRACT 
The Genocide Convention imposes a duty on States to prevent and punish 
the crime of genocide. Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations gives 
the Security Council the primary res·ponsibility for maintaining and restoring 
international peace and security. 
Since the end of the Cold War the United Nations Security Council has found 
a new freedom to act. Using this the Security Council has widened the 
definition of threat to international peace and security to include widespread 
violations of human rights, including genocide. By classifying genocide as a 
threat to international peace and security the Security Council has assumed 
the primary responsibility for its suppression and therefore has a duty to 
intervene in defence of humanity. 
International law is supplemented by the general principles of domestic law. 
As such a comparison with a domestic duty to rescue, with the role of the 
Security Council in mind is useful in establishing the scope of such a duty; 
consequently comparisons with authorized security officers will be more 
salient than with civilian rescuers. The concepts of proximity and risk 
normally present in the duty to rescue in domestic law must be reevaluated 
for the international law. 
The consequences of this duty are far reaching. The questions of what will 
constitute a breach and what sanctions there might be for a breach are 
addressed. 
Imposing sanctions on individual Member States who block Security Council 
action will promote intervention at any cost and threaten the legitimacy of 
Security Council decision making. 
The text of this paper (excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and 
annexures) comprises approximatey 11,975 words. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
On May 20 1998 United States President Bill Clinton stood in Kigali, the 
capital of Rwanda and stated that the international community should have 
acted sooner to prevent the genocide that took place there in 1994.
1 In 
making his statement, Clinton spread blame liberally among the members of 
the international community. This assumption of partial responsibility four 
years later has underscored the movement of international thinking toward 
the conclusion that the international community must act when genocide 
and other gross breaches of human rights occur. 
With the end of the Cold War and the demise of the essentially bipolar 
world, the Security Council has found a new freedom to act. In 1991, the 
success of the coalition forces in Iraq, under the auspices of the United 
Nations, signaled the Security Council's apparent willingness to intervene in 
defence of humanity. Since then the Security Council has authorized various 
interventions either under United Nations command or State command with 
UN backing, in an attempt to forcibly rectify what have largely been internal, 
rather than inter-state conflicts. It appears that the Security Council, in 
authorizing these interventions, has included widespread deprivations of 
human rights in an expanded mandate to determine 'threats to the peace'. 
The Tribunal for War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia has stated "It can be 
said that there is a common understanding manifested by the 'subsequent 
practice' of the membership of the United Nations at large, that the 'threat to 
the peace' of Article 39 may include, as one of its species, internal armed 
conflicts". 2 Many writers have concluded that this practice of the Security 
Council has established a 'right' to forcibly intervene in the affairs of a State 
1 "Remarks honouring Genocide Survivors in Kigali, Rwanda" March 281998, 34 Weekly 
Comp Pres Doc 495 [Genocide Survivors]. 
2 Prosecutor v Ousko Tadic, Decision on the defence motion for interlocutory Appeal on 
Jurisdiction. UN Doc IT-94-1-AR72 (Oct 2, 1995) para 30; (1996) 35 ILM 35. 
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where citizens are subject to massive and widespread human rights 
violations.3 
While strong arguments have been presented for the right of the UN to 
collective humanitarian intervention, opinion is still sharply divided on the 
right of unilateral intervention by another state.4 This is primarily due to the 
high risk of abuse. This paper concentrates on the right to collective 
humanitarian intervention by the United Nations. While recognizing that 
intervention takes place in many forms along a continuum of political, 
economic and military options, for the purposes to this paper the definition 
has been narrowed. Humanitarian Intervention refers to the threat or use of 
force by an international actor for the purpose of alleviating a widespread 
deprivation of internationally recognized human rights, in particular the 
right to life. Collective Humanitarian Intervention is the use of such force by 
an international organization, or group of states to achieve those ends. 
\ 
The paper aims to take the interventionist view one step furtJ:ler. It is my 
contention that not only does the UN in the form of the Security Council 
have the right to intervene in defence of humanity, it has a legal duty to do 
so. The question of a duty to intervene has been examined in the past, and 
concluded that a duty has not yet been established at international law.
5 
However, as the 10th anniversary of the end of the cold war approaches, it is 
time to revisit the topic in light of a decade of Security Council practice and 
United Nations humanitarian intervention. 
3 See for example, Fernando Tes6n "Collective Humanitarian Intervention" (1996) 17 Mich J 
Int'l L 323,327. [Tes6n]; Mark Hutchinson "Restoring Hope: UN Security Council 
Resolutions for Somalia and an expanded doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention" (1993) 34 
Harv. Int'l LJ 624, [Hutchinson]. 
4 Tes6n above n3, 323. 
5 Nigel Rodley " Collective Intervention to Protect Human Rights and Civilian Populations: 
the Legal Framework" in Nigel Rodley ( ed) To Loose the Bands of Wickedness (Brassey' s (UK) 
Ltd, London, 1992) 14, 35 [Rodley] . 
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II. GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
At the outset, it is necessary to outline the General Principles of International 
law that apply to humanitarian intervention. Article 2(7) of the Charter of the 
United Nations reads as follows: 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to 
submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this 
principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures 
under Chapter VII. 
This provision enunciates one of the core principles of international law, the 
principle of non-intervention. Traditionally the principle of non-intervention 
was based on the idea that anything that happened within the borders of a 
State was no others State's formal business. The United Nations interpreted 
the 'domestic jurisdiction' rule broadly and the accompanying human rights 
promotion clauses narrowly.6 States could argue that anything that 
happened within their borders was within the domestic jurisdiction of that 
state and therefore immune from international debate let alone intervention. 
A. Domestic jurisdiction 
There are two schools of thought on the domestic jurisdiction of states. The 
first, the essentialist view, proposes that the essential nature of a sovereign 
state requires that some matters, usually those closely related to the 
sovereignty of the state, be left to the states own sovereign judgment.7 This 
position has some inherent flaws . With the movement toward concepts of 
popular sovereignty rather than the sovereign's sovereignty the argument 
becomes circular. Domestic jurisdiction derives from the essential attributes 
6 Rodley above nS, 18. 
7 Tes6n above n3, 327. 
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of sovereignty; however, sovereignty (at least of the popular kind) is derived 
from the people, who form the domestic jurisdiction. 
The second school of thought is the legalist theory, which states that the 
domestic jurisdiction of a state is a relative matter, which depends on 
international law at any given moment. That is, where a rule of international 
law regulates an issue, it automatically ceases to be a matter of exclusive 
jurisdiction for any state bound by that rule. For example, while there may be 
a presumption that human rights form part of the domestic jurisdiction of a 
state, where the state has bound itself internationally, through custom or 
treaty with respect to the issue, the presumption of domestic jurisdiction is 
rebutted.8 However, the 'domestic jurisdiction ends where international 
jurisdiction begins' theory does not provide clear answers because of the 
fluid nature of international law. Rosalyn Higgins has proposed that 
domestic jurisdiction ends where a state's "actions cause substantial 
international effects".9 This theory seems attractive in explaining increasing 
international 'interference' in a world that is becoming increasingly 
globalized, and where states are more interdependent than ever before. 
Fernando Tes6n feels this concept is outmoded.10 He cites as proof the 
development of human rights away from the domestic jurisdiction, despite 
the fact they seem to constitute what he calls the paradigm of an 'essentially 
domestic' matter since they define the relationship between government and 
subjects, and have little direct external effect. 
The movement of human rights from within the domestic jurisdiction began 
well before the post Cold War era. In 1967 the UN Commission on Human 
Rights sought and obtained authorization to consider "consistent patterns of 
gross violations of human rights".11 Following this an ad hoe working group 
of experts on Southern Africa was established and several other 
8 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States) 
(1986) ICJ 14, 131. 
9 Rosalyn Higgins" The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of 
the United Nations" (Oxford University Press, London, New York, 1963) 62. 
10 Tes6n above n3, 329. 
11 ECOSOC Res. 1235 (XLII) 6 June 1967. 
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investigations commenced. More recently, the General Assembly has passed 
resolutions on the human rights situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, El 
Salvador, Iraq, Burma, Afghanistan, Israeli Occupied Territories, Haiti and 
Iran.12 It is now accepted that human rights are no longer part of the 
exclusive domestic jurisdiction of a state. 
B. Sovereignty 
Traditionally, the substantive meaning of sovereignty in international 
relations has mandated the legal independence and self-determination of 
states.13 However in recent times there has been a movement from traditional 
sovereignty, the sovereign's sovereignty, to a more populist based 
sovereignty. 'Popular Sovereignty' has permitted interference, under certain 
circumstances, in what were traditionally the domestic affairs of states.14 
Popular sovereignty is the concept that the basis for authority and the 
-legitimizing force of sovereignty is the consent of the people in the territory 
in which it purports to excercise power.15 It follows that if the rights of the 
people are being violated by the state, the state is no longer fulfilling its 
purpose, namely to allow society to function peacefully and effectively. 
When this becomes the case the government is no longer legitimate, and the 
people can call in their 'loan' of sovereignty.16 Philip Allot provides a similar 
view: 
"If you claim to have legal power, if you seek to act on the basis of a legal 
power, you acknowledge the legal system which creates the power and 
which it confers on you, and you acknowledge that the power is in 
12 UN GAOR, 46th Sess. (1992). 
13 Michael Reppas "The Lawfulness of Humanitarian Intervention" [1997] 9 St. Thomas L Rev 
463,466. 
14 W Micheal Reisman "Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contempory International Law" 
[1990] 84 AJIL 866. 
15 This is supported by Article 21(3) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, "The will 
of the people shall be the basis of authority of government". 
16 K Mills "Sovereignty Eclipsed?: The Legitimacy of Humanitarian Access and Intervention" 
J Hum Ass <http:/ /www-jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/a/a012.html> (reposted 4 July 1997), n60 
[Sovereignty Eclipsed]. 
7 
principle limited, and you acknowledge the specific limits of the power. 
Thus those who are acting within the realm of the socially constructed 
state must accept the purposes of that entity in order to be able to claim 
legitimacy for their actions." 17 
C. Threat or Use of Force 
Article 2(4) of the Charter prevents the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state. However, this does 
not apply where the Security Council authorizes enforcement measures 
under Chapter VII of the Charter.18 Further, the threat to use force will be 
illegal in circumstances where the actual use of force would be contrary to 
international law. 
The use of force is governed by the restricting principles of necessity and 
proportionality. The principle of necessity, established in the Caroline case,19 
dictates that no measures short of armed force would be sufficient to stop the 
human rights violations in question. In effect this means that all other 
measures should have been exhausted, except in cases where this sort of 
delay would mean irreparable harm.20 When dealing with interventions by 
the Security Council, Article 42 of the Charter also requires that the Security 
Council have determined that non-forceful measures would be inadequate or 
have proved inadequate. 
The principle of proportionality requires that the degree of intervention 
taken is proportionate to the gravity of the situation. Kenneth Campbell has 
argued that the degree of force that is required in a humanitarian crisis is 
17 Philip Allott Eunomia: N~v Order for a New World (New York, Oxford University Press, 
1990) 313, cited in Sovereignty Eclipsed above n16. 
18 Article 2(4) UN Charter. 
19 The Caroline Case (1837) 29 BFSP 1137; 30 BFSP 195. 
20 Rodley above nS, 37. 
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directly proportional to the intent of the human actors.21 That is, in crises that 
are the result of natural phenomena, for example, drought or seismic activity, 
force will be ineffectual and unnecessary. On the other hand, mass atrocities 
perpetuated by human actors (such as genocide) call for swift military action 
to end the suffering as quickly as possible and bring the actors to the 
negotiating table. This theory recognizes that the primary role of military 
force is as an instrument to change human behaviour. 
Thus, humanitarian crises are arranged on a scale between those with 
criminal human intent and therefore most vulnerable to force, and those least 
dependent on human intent. The possible responses range from 
overwhelming military force in situations of genocide (human made, 
premeditated, mass murder), through deployment of UN peacekeepers for 
example in situations of mass starvation as the unintended byproduct of 
internal conflict, to no military force for natural disasters. 
This typography of humanitarian crisis proves a useful scale in judging the 
merits of each intervention and the type of intervention most likely to 
· succeed. 
III. THE RISE AND FALL OF INTERVENTIONISM 
While some find the erosion of the non-intervention norm to be 
impermissible, history shows that strict adherence to and support for the 
principle has ebbed and flowed with the tide of world order.22 Levels of 
support for a right of intervention have been rising since the 1970's as new 
exceptions erode the traditional prohibition against intervention.23 Kegley et 
al have described circumstances where intervention has traditionally been 
perceived as more permissible: 
21 Kenneth J Campbell "The Role of Force in Humanitarian Intervention"(1997) 3(2) Airman-
Scholar. <http: / /www.usafa.af.mil/wing/34edg/airman /campbe-l.htm> (last accessed 30 
September 1998), [Campbell] . 
22 Charles Kegley et al "The Rise and Fall of the Non-intervention Norm" [1998] 22 Fletcher F 
World Aff 81, 82 [Kegley]; see also: Thoman Biersteker & Cynthia Weber State Sovereignty as 
Social Construct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
23 Kegley above n22, 89. 
• 
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"Generalising, it would appear that international society's 
acceptance of the right to intervene has risen in periods when (1) 
political transitions from one type of authority structure within 
states were frequent or expected; (2) the great powers' governing 
institutions were growing increasingly similar and 
homogeneous; (3) the threat of war between sovereign states 
was low; (4) the incidence of civil wars within sovereign states 
was high, and (5) issues surrounding the maintenance and 
territorial integrity of the state and the authority structures of 
governments were uppermost on the global agenda. "24 
These circumstances describe almost exactly the movement of world order 
since the end of the cold war and the disintegration of the former USSR. 
Governments are becoming increasing more democratic as the influence of 
communist Russia has decreased. Regional and continental associations of 
states are evolving ways to deepen co-operation and ease some of the 
contentious characteristics of sovereign and nationalistic rivalries.25 At the 
same time advancing technology, greater communications and global trade 
are blurring the boundaries of nations. This 'globalisation' of the world is 
also assisted by decisions of states to join larger political associations, 
yielding some of their sovereign powers in the process. The emergence of the 
European Union as a strong political player and the development of the 
common currency are a case in point. This has the effect of making state's 
governing institutions increasingly homogenous, thereby lowering the risk 
of interstate conflicts. 
In a 1995 supplement to his Agenda for Peace, United Nations Secretary 
Gent!ral Boutros Boutros Ghali commented on the increasing occurrence of 
intra-state violence: 
24 Kegley above n22, 92. 
25 An Agenda for Peace: Report of the Secretary General pursuant to the statement adopted 
by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992. (17 June 1992) UN Doc 
A/47 /277 - S/ 24111. 
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"[S]o many of today's conflicts are within states rather than 
between States. The end of the cold war removed constraints that 
had inhibited conflict in the former Soviet Union and elsewhere. As 
a result there has been a rash of wars with )n newly independent 
states, often of a religious or ethnic character and often involving 
unusual violence and cruelty. The end of the cold war seems also to 
have contributed to an outbreak of such wars in Africa. In addition, 
many of the proxy wars fueled by the cold war within states 
remain unresolved. Inter-state wars, by contrast, have become 
. f 1126 m requent. 
Further, increased attention to the principle self determination has brought 
the issue of territorial integrity to the fore of the global agenda. As the 
process of 'blue-water' colonial self determination comes to an end, the 
international community has struggled with issues of self determination for 
peoples within established international frontiers. Issues of sovereignty and 
the appropriate authority structures for distinct ethnic groups, communities 
and populations within states are once again high on the agenda of the 
international community. 
The current move towards a right of humanitarian intervention is part of a 
movement that started in the 1970's. While some commentators view this 
transition with skepticism and more than a little apprehension,2
7 it must be 
viewed in its appropriate context. Support for intervention has always 
fluctuated with the state of the world order; As such, this current push for 
interventionism is simply the product of a global transition from the post 
cold war order, which has dominated world politics for so long. 
It may perhaps be argued that, much as the principle of non-intervention is 
causing problems for pro-interventionists now, imposing a duty to intervene 
on the United Nations interferes with the natural fluctuation. This would 
26 Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Fiftieth 
Anniversary of the United Nations (1995) UN GAOR, 50th Sess, UN Doc. A/50/60. 
27 See generally; Jim Whitman" A Cautionary Note on Humanitarian Intervention" J Hum 
Assistance, <http:/ /www-jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/a /a022.html> (posted 15 September 1995). 
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result in an unacceptable precedent as world opinion 
once again shifts 
towards non-intervention. 
While there is merit in this argument, several factors in 
the current world 
situation have pushed us to a point where return to a stric
t non-intervention 
norm is no longer possibl~. 
Firstly, the population of the world has increased steadi
ly during the past 
decade and is set to continue in this manner. As countrie
s struggle to cope 
with the demands of their own increasing populations the
y have less ability 
to cope with any influx of displaced persons fleeing conflic
t in a neighboring 
state. Intervention early on in conflict minimizes the nu
mbers of refugees 
and hence the impact of these displaced persons on host
 states' economies 
and environmental resources. The Republic of Congo has 
experienced these 
effects first hand as a million refugees fled Rwanda, cross
ed the border into 
what was then Zaire. Food prices soared and the labor ma
rket crumbled as a 
massive surplus of labor hit the economy. These effec
ts led to strained 
relations within the host state providing an environm
ent ripe for new 
conflicts to emerge. 
Secondly, the threat of conflicts spilling over into neigh
boring states has 
increased as the physical size of states has decreased. Cont
ainment of conflict 
remains important to states, as states break up into ever-sm
aller 'component 
states'. Further, the current global salience of self-determi
nation means that 
the number of small states is likely to increase rather than
 decrease. As the 
process of self determination of blue-water colonies is com
pleting, many of 
these new 'independence struggles' have an increase
d propensity for 
violence. 
The globalization of the international community plays a
 large part in the 
push for interventionism. Increased globalization of trad
e and economics 
further prohibits a return to a strict non-intervention norm
. Conflicts pose a 
threat to international markets for goods both in preven
ting access to the 
particular state in conflict but also in disturbing trade 
routes and other 
established practices. Regional trade alliances such as G
ATT and the EC 
12 
would not be impressed by the disruption of productive economic relations 
as a result of civil conflict. Intervention to resolve the conflict as quickly as 
possible and with minimal damage to production plants means those 
economic relations can be restored promptly.
28 
The push for interventionism is particularly affected by modern 
telecommunications and electronic media access. In what has been dubbed 
the "CNN Effect" television footage of suffering victims of humanitarian 
disasters intruding into the sanctity of people's living rooms, mobilizes and 
encourages populations to support and call for intervention. The hideous 
destructiveness of war is now beamed to us in graphic multicolored detail 
and in a virtual electronic simultaneity.
29 Events happening half a world 
away now have the proximity of the neighborhood and have become part of 
our consciousness. Added to this is the fact that news coverage, at least in 
New Zealand, is not censored for violent content, but rather, left to editorial 
discretion. As Michael Reisman points out "the wars that are presented most 
graphically are also presented - often with inane apologies for 'graphic 
material', as if the media had no alternative but to present the war - in terms 
of high moral drama, almost always with simplified glosses as to who are the 
righteous and who are the villains. The greater the graphic content, the 
greater the moral content. ... This moralization of conflict puts great pressure 
on audiences to 'stop the carnage' in a particular conflict where the 'innocent 
victims' are suffering and losing"30 , / 
I 
As technology has advanced the population of the world has become more 
affected by conflict impinging on their consciousness. As this increased 
awareness continues it seems unlikely that populations, at least in 
democratic states, will allow their governments to sit idly by and do nothing 
28 It must be remembered that many of these wars may also prove economically and 
politically beneficial to some states who are not involved as belligerents, however the 
numbers are limited; W Michael Reisman "Stopping Wars and Making Peace: Reflections on 
the Ideology and Practice of Conflict Termination in Contemporary World Politics" [1998] 6 
Tul J Int'l & Comp L 5, 8. [Reisman, Stopping Wars] 
29 Reisman, Stopping Wars above n28, 9. 
30 Reisman, Stopping Wars above n28, 10. 
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to help. For example, public pressure is credited with forcing the United 
States to finally act in Rwanda after news spread of a million people being 
hacked to death. 
~ 
IV. THE EVOLVING NATURE OF 'THREAT TO THE PEACE' 
Article 39 provides: 
"The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make 
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in 
accordance with Article 41 and 42, to maintain or restore 
international peace and security." 
Article 39 gives the Security Council the discretion to determine what 
constitutes a threat to the peace. Thus by "employing a liberal construction of 
[Article 39] the Security Council may sanction collective security actions 
anywhere in the globe where humanitarian abuses constitute a threat to the 
peace".31 The Security Council has given the term threat to international 
peace and security a wide reading since the end of the cold war. Indeed the 
Security Council commented in 1992, "The absence of war and military 
conflicts amongst states does not in itself ensure international peace and 
security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, 
humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and 
security". 32 
In response, Marc Boutin has formulated a test for determining what ) 1 
constitutes a threat to international peace and security, however his claim of ~, 
' I 
objectivity cannot be sustained.33 The test weighs the need for humanitarian 
intervention against impediments such as the logistics and availability of 
31 Hutchinson above n3, 624-625. 
32 Surrunit Statement Concerning the Councils Responsibility in the Maintenance of 
International Peace and Security (1992) 31 ILM 758, 761. 
33 Marc Boutin "Somalia: the Legality of UN Forcible Humanitarian Intervention" (1994) 17 
Suffolk Transnat'l L Rev 138, 161-162. 
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resources. Member states of the Security Council come with a view of what 
situations require intervention coloured by their background, past 
experiences and political standing. It is this reality that provides much of the 
legitimacy of the Security Council's actions on the theory that the opposing 
views of member states will curb excesses in any one direction. To say that 
such a determination will not be subjective ignores this reality. 
Further, the test confuses practicality and realpolitik with legal justification. 
Impediments such as logistics and supply of resources are relevant only to 
the question of what action, if any, will be taken, or the scale on which an 
action will take place, rather than the legality of such an action. The United 
Nations debacle over Rwanda is a case in point. The Security Council 
recognized the need for action, but lack of resources and the strength of the 
US disapproval meant the subsequent French intervention was too little, too 
late. That did not detract from the legality of the action. 
Anti-interventionists argue that interference in humanitarian situations 
cannot be justified as the Security Council mandate refers only to 
"international peace and security" (emphaJiS added). The rebuttal to this 
argument is twofold. Firstly, it is a legal fallacy to say, in this age of 
globalization, that the effects of civil 'w'"ar"s do not threaten international 
peace. In the civil wars in which the UN has intervened in this decade, 
thousands of refugees have fled from the brutality of their homeland into 
neighboring states. These massive displacements have a major impact on the 
host countries. For example, approximately one million refugees fled the 
fighting in Rwanda across the border in to what was Zaire? a further 90,000 
to Tanzania. In Zaire especially, this massive influx sent food prices soaring 
and created a surplus of labor. As well as the economic effect, the influx has 
caused a huge environmental impact on the region. The strain on resources 
also lead to the spread of ethnic violence in Zaire between Zairians and 
Rwandan refugees. In turn, this strained relations between Rwanda and 
Zaire, with the Zairian army blocking off entire refugee camps and forcibly 
returning refugees to Rwanda. Furthermore, according to Zairian 
34 Now called the Republic of Congo. 
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newspapers, Zaire also supplied arms to the Rwandan army-in-exile 
preparing for a re-invasion of Rwanda.
35 These cross border incursions are 
undoubtedly a threat to international peace. 
Subsequent Security Council practice under Chapter VII of the Charter has 
expanded the definition of threat to international peace and security. A brief 
survey of the United Nations interventions since the end of the Cold War 
shows a greater willingness to treat failure to protect human rights as threats 
to peace and security. 
A. Iraq 
During the Gulf War military campaign, President Bush and other foreign 
leaders expressed optimism that Iraqi nationals would "take matters into 
their own hands" and remove Saddam Hussein from power.
36 At the end of 
the conflict, coalition forces had pushed the Iraqi army back from Kuwait 
and into southern Iraq. The resounding defeat of the Iraqi army, combined 
with this foreign encouragement stirred rebellion against the government 
amongst the Kurds in the north of Iraq and the Shiite Muslims in the 
southern marshes. As civil unrest broke out the government was left trying 
to curb insurrections on two fronts. 
By March 16 1990, the Kurdish rebels claimed they controlled 80-90 percent 
of the land in the northern Iraqi province of Kurdistan.
37 However once the 
Iraqi military forces had quelled the rebellion in the south, Baghdad moved 
thousands of troops north to face the Kurdish threat.
38 The Iraqi government 
forces launched intensive air, missile and artillery attacks against Kurdish 
35 B Smith "Field Report: The Need for Humanitarian Intervention in Central Africa" (1996) 3 
Human Rights Brief, 
<http:/ /www.wcl.american.edu/pub/humright/brief/v3i3/rwanda33.html>, [Smith]. 
36 "Remarks to Raytheon Missile Systems Plant Employees in Andover, Massachusetts" 15 
February 1991, 27 Weekly Comp Pres Doc 177. 
37 "US threatens to down any Iraqi Combat Aircraft" Wash . Post, March 161991, Al. 
38 "Kurds seize Iraqi Base and Work to Demoralise Saddam's Army" Wash. Post, March 28 
1991, Al. 
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villages forcing millions of Kurds to flee into the mountainous countryside 
making for the Turkish border. Conditions in the mountains were severe. 
With no shelter or sanitation for the fleeing masses, the death rate rose to 
1000 per day within weeks. The situation worsened as Turkey closed its 
border after some 20,000 - 40,000 Kurds had crossed into lower lying refugee 
camps. Troops were deployed along the border in an attempt to stop the 
flood of Kurds into Turkey from overwhelming their outlying provinces. 
Refugees continued to mass along the border, thus increasing the 
humanitarian emergency. Similar effects were being felt on the border with 
Iran, where an estimated 500,000 Iraqi nationals had crossed into Iran during 
the fighting. Both Turkey and Iran called on the international community to 
act. 
In response the Security Council passed Resolution 688, noting its 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and 
found for the first time that the "massive flow of refugees towards and across 
international frontiers and to cross border incursions" threatened 
international peace and security.39 Further, the resolution characterized Iraqi 
compliance with humanitarian demands as "a contribution to international 
peace and security in the region". 
While the UN did not explicitly authorize the use of force in establishing 
'safe havens' and 'no fly zones', some commentators have suggested that the 
allied coalition force was implicitly authorized by the Security Council as the 
"blossom of the seed planted by resolution 688".40 
The change in the official UN view of state sovereignty in the wake of 
operations Desert Storm and Provide Comfort is apparent in the speeches of 
UN Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar. Early on, the Secretary-
General warned that the planned intervention would require approval by the 
39 SC Res 688 UN SCOR 461h Sess 2982 mtg, UN Doc S/RES/ 688 (1991) . The resolution was 
passed 10 to 3 with 2 abstentions. China made reference to 'domestic jurisdiction' under 
Article 2(7) in abstaining from the vote. 
40 Sean Murphy Humanitarian Intervention: The UN in an Evolving World Order (University of 
Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia,1996) 194, [Murphy]. 
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Security Council, noting that the situation posed a legal problem.41 However, 
in his Report on the Work of the Organization later that year, his tone had 
change somewhat: 
" It is now increasingly felt that the principle of non-intervention 
with the essential domestic jurisdiction of states cannot be 
regarded as a protective barrier behind which human rights can 
be massively or systematically violated with impunity ... 
We need not impale ourselves on the horns of a dilemma between 
respect for sovereignty and the protection of human rights . . . 
what is involved is not the right of intervention but the collective 
obligation of states to bring relief and redress in human rights 
emergencies". 42 
Perez de Celluar's admission that state sovereignty must occasionally yield 
to human rights concerns was an important step for the UN in accepting 
humanitarian intervention as a principle of international law.43 
B. Bosnia-Herzegovina 
18 
The conflict in the former Yugoslavia was extremely complex and protracted. / 
As the Soviet Union collapsed/{he six republics of Yugoslavia, loosely held ). 
19
' 
together since Tito's death in 1980, began the process of secession. Croatia 
and Slovenia declared their independence on June 25 1991. Almost 
immediately the Serb dominated Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA) rolled tanks 
into the former republics beginning a civil war. Eventually cease-fires were 
established in both Slovenia and Croatia by the European Community and 
UN respectively. 
41 Tes6n above n3, 346. 
42 Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organisation UN GAOR 461h Sess. Supp. 
No.1, 5; UN Doc A/ 46/1 (1991). 
43 Tes6n above n3, 347. 
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, a referendum was held on February 29 and March 1, 
1992 in which more than sixty two percent of the voters favored 
independence.44 The government declared independence on March 3 1992. In 
April 1992 just days before the United States and other NATO countries 
recognised Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state, Serb forces 
launched an attack on Bosnia from Serbia,45 supporting the efforts of the 
Bosnian Serb rebels to overthrow the government. The process of 'ethnic 
cleansing', creating ethnically pure areas in controlled territory, began. The 
atrocities committed, including indiscriminate vicious attacks on civilians, 
sieges of cities sheltering starving refugees, mass rape and inhumane 
treatment of prisoners equalled those of the Nazi party during World War 
II.46 
The first time that the Security Council contemplated authorising coercive 
measures to deal with the conflict was in the summer of 1992.47 Resolution 
770 called upon States to use "all necessary measures" to facilitate the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance to Bosnia-Herzegovina.48 The resolution 
openly recognized that provision of humanitarian assistance was an 
important element in restoring international peace and security in the area. 
Given the similarity of the language to the 'all necessary means' language 
used in authorizing force in the Gulf War there was no doubt that the 
resolution was intended to serve as a basis for military intervention by 
member states to assist in the distribution of supplies, should they choose to 
do so. The debate surrounding the adoption of the resolution makes this 
clear. It is also clear that the commission of atrocities was foremost in the 
minds of the delegates and was a powerful motivation for their votes, clearly 
endorsing the doctrine of humanitarian intervention.49 
44 "Bosnian Leader Warns Serbs to Respect Vote Verdict" The Times (London), March 4 1992, 
8. 
45 Murphy above n40, 200. 
46 Murphy above n40, 200; Tes6n above n3, 366. 
47 Tes6n above n3, 367. 
48 SC Res 770 UN SCOR 47th Sess 3106 mtg, 24; UN Doc S/ INF / 48 (1993) . 
49 Tes6n above n3, 367. 
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In October 1992 the Security Council established a no-fly-zone in the airspace 
over Bosnia in order to protect humanitarian relief flights from Serbian 
attack. When this proved ineffective the Security Council passed Resolution 
816 authorising member states "acting nationally or through regional 
organisations" to take "all necessary measures" to ensure compliance with 
the flight ban.50 NATO's North Atlantic Council agreed to provide air 
support to enforce the ban. 
In April and May of 1993 the Security Council established six 'safe havens' in 
former Muslim enclaves for the protection of Bosnian civilians. In addition 
they expanded the mandate of the United Nations force present on the 
ground (UNPROFOR) to enable it to deter attacks against those areas, 
occupy certain points to that end and reply to the continual bombardments 
by the Serbs against the safe-havens.51 Further, member states acting 
nationally or through regional organisations were authorised to take "all 
necessary measures, through the use of air power" in and around the safe-
havens to protect Bosnian Muslims and in support of UNPROFOR. 
The Bosnian Serbs continued to attack the UN declared safe-havens. After 
the shelling of a crowded open air market in Sarejevo which killed 66 and 
wounded more than 200, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali sent a 
letter to NATO requesting that they decide whether to use air power as a 
response to the shelling. 
NATO launched air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions, allowing UN 
troops access to the besieged town of Majec and preventing the safe-haven of 
Gorazde from being overrun. A cease-fire was established between the 
Bosnian Muslims and Croats allowing the Bosnian government army to 
focus its efforts on defeating the Serbian rebels. Former US president Jimmy 
Carter brokered a cease-fire in January 1995 which held until March, when 
the Bosnian government began a major offensive against the Serbian rebels, 
regaining significant area in Central and Northern Bosnia. The offensive 
50 SC Res 816 UN SCOR 48th Sess 3191st mtg, 4; UN Doc S/INF/49 (1994). 
51 SC Res 836 UN SCOR 48th Sess 3228th mtg, 13; UN Doc S/INF/ 49 (1994). 
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prompted the Serbian rebels to move their heavy artillery back to Sarejevo 
and both sides resumed shelling. UNPROFOR threatened to conduct 
airstrikes if either side did not desist, and when the Serb rebels failed to do 
so, NATO jets were dispatched to bomb arms depots at the rebels' 
headquarters.s2 Instead of backing down, the rebels proceeded to shell five of 
the six safe-havens and take more than 300 UNPROFOR troops hostage. 
They chained many of them at strategic locations as human shields against 
further NATO bombing.s3 
The Bosnian-Serbs overran the safe-haven at Srebrenica on July 11 1995, 
forcing Muslim civilians to flee for their lives and trapping UN personnel in 
the former enclave. New evidence of Serb atrocities made the daily papers,54 
and within two weeks the rebels had overrun a second safe haven of Zepa. 
The combination of a Croatian offensive against Croatian Serbs and 
continued NATO attacks against Bosnian Serb positions forced the Serbs to 
the negotiating table and a countrywide cease-fire was declared on October 
6, 1995. The Dayton-Paris peace accord was signed on December 14 1995. 
While the original declaration of threat to the peace and security in the area 
was linked to the interstate conflict it became apparent that the atrocities 
being committed in Bosnia-Herzegovina were the major driving force behind 
the authorisation of force. 
C. Somalia 
Civil war broke out in Somalia in 1988 in an attempt to oust President 
Mohammed Siad Barre. After he was overthrown in January 1991, the 
factions and clans seeking his removal turned on each other, killing 
thousands of people, uprooting hundreds of thousands more from their 
homes, destroying the country's economy and infrastructure.ss As the 
52 "NATO Jets Bomb Arms Depot at Bosnian Serb Headquarters" NY Times, May 26, 1995, 1, 
cited in Murphy above n40, 211. 
53 "After a 2d strike from NATO, Serbs detain UN forces" NY Times, May 281995,1 cited in 
Murphy above n40, 211. 
54 See eg:"Witnesses Alledge abuses by Serbs" Wash Post July 16, 1995, 1. 
55 Murphy above n40, 218. 
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world's media showed reports of mass starvation, various countries and 
organizations organized shipments of food and other supplies to the 
beleaguered state. However, the civil war raging within the country 
prevented effective distribution of relief supplies. 
In January 1992, the UN Security Council passed a resolution stating that it 
was 'concerned' that the continuation of the situation in Somalia constituted 
a threat to international peace and security.56 However the resolution does 
not refer to the movement of refugees out of the country although the 
Security Council was certainly aware of the fact. The preamble of the 
resolution expresses alarm at the "heavy loss of human life and widespread 
material damage" in Somalia and its "consequences on stability and peace in 
the region". 
In March, a UN sponsored cease-fire agreement was signed by two warring 
factions which provided for a UN observer mission to stabilize the cease-fire 
on the understanding that one of the objectives of the mission would be to 
assist with the delivery of humanitarian aid.57 The cease-fire was widely 
ignored. 
Interim Prime Minister Omer Arteh Qualib (selected at a reconciliation 
conference in July 1991) appealed to the Security Council for an immediate 
meeting to discuss the rapidly deteriorating situation in Somalia. The appeal 
began a series of resolutions aimed at the peaceful settlement of the civil war 
and its impact on the Somali population. The resolutions gradually 
intensified as the previous initiatives failed, laying the legal foundation for 
the decision in December 1992 to use military force . 
In December 1992, the United Nations estimated Somali deaths at more than 
300,000; a further 900,000 Somalis had fled to neighboring Kenya, Ethiopia 
and Djibouti and to Yemen and Saudi Arabia.58 The International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC) estimated that 1.5 million Somalis faced imminent 
56 SC Res 733 UN SCOR 3039th mtg; UN Doc S/ RES/733 (1992). 
57 SC Res 751 UN SCOR 47th Sess 30691h mtg, 2; UN Doc S/RES/751 (1992). 
58 Murphy above n40, 218. 
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starvation and three times that number were dependent on external food 
assistance.59 On December 3 the Security Council passed Resolution 794 
authorizing military force - "all necessary means" - to establish a secure 
environment for humanitarian operations in Somalia.
60 
The resolution helped the Security Council build on the precedent set by the 
Iraqi crisis and again expanded the definition of threat to international peace 
and security. The resolution provides as follows: 
"Determining that the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in 
Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of 
humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security, 
7. Endorses the recommendation by the Secretary-General in his letter of 29 
November 1992 (S/24868) that action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations should be taken in order to establish a secure environment for humanitarian 
relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible; 
10. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorises the 
Secretary-General and Member States co-operating to implement the offer referred 
to in paragraph 8 above to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a 
secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia;
61 
Resolution 794 followed a United States offer of 20,000 troops to assist in 
ensuring aid distribution, as part of a multinational Unified Task Force. The 
US formally turned the project over to the United Nations on May 4 1993. 
Resolution 814, establishing UNOSOMII, is significant in that it is the first 
time that the United Nations deployed its own force with specific 
authorization to resort to all necessary means.
62 
The implementation of the UN mandate took a turn for the worse as 
UNOSOMII took on 'nation-building' projects such as disarming factions and 
59 Tes6n above n3, 349. 
60 SC Res 794 UN SCOR 47th Sess 3145th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/794 (1992). 
61 Resolution 767 had previously asserted that the "situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security" However no reference was made to specifics of the 
situation; SC Res 767 UN SCOR 47th Sess, 310151 mtg, UN Doc S/ RES/ 767 (1992). 
62 Res 794 autherised a United States force. 
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arresting faction leaders.63 This increased effort resulted in conflict with one 
of the faction leaders Mohammed Farah Aideed, leaving 24 Pakistani UN 
troops dead and 54 wounded in the worst single attack in UN peacekeeping 
history. Recurring conflict between UN forces and Somali gunmen occurred 
throughout 1993. In all, 100 UN troops were killed during the mission,64 
including 18 elite US rangers in a failed mission to capture Aideed for the 
violence visited upon the UN forces. 
The death of the US rangers and subsequent television footage of one of the 
bodies being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, brought home to the 
American public the risks of engagement in humanitarian missions. The 
ensuing surge of public outrage proved a catalyst for a change in US foreign 
policy regarding intervention. 
The situation in Somalia allowed the Security Council to expand its 
interpretation of threat to international peace and security to include the 
human tragedy that was taking place. 
Lack of effective government in Somalia assisted the Security Council in 
reaching its mandate under Chapter Vll.65 When no authorities exist capable 
of governing a country, the values of political independence and sovereignty 
normally at stake appear to be minimalised.66 Without a legitimate authority 
that could speak for the entire state the Security Council could point to any 
number of smaller groups as a source of invitation for intervention.67 It is not 
clear, however, that the international community would act in the same way 
had there been authorities fully in control of Somalia. 
The most important aspect of the Security Council action was that it asserted 
it was acting under Chapter VII of the Charter to address a threat to 
international peace and security. However, neither resolution 794 or 814 
mentions the massive flow of refugees across international frontiers, which 
63 Tes6n above n3, 350. 
64 Tes6n above n3, 350. 
65 Hutchinson above n3, 632. 
66 Murphy above n40, 238. 
67 Hutchinson above n3, 633. 
24 
was the impetus for action in the Iraqi crisis. Instead, they refer to the human 
tragedy taking place, the "internal catastrophe of violence and starvation 
inflicted on the Somali people ... The sense of the debate over Resolution 794 
was that the domestic situation alone warranted action and would anywhere 
that it might occur globally".68 
The Security Council was well aware of the ground breaking steps that it was 
taking in this regard and of the effect of precedent that this would have when 
viewed together with the interventions in Iraq in 1991 and Bosnia in 1992. 
The statements of governments and non-governmental groups during 1992-
93 indicate acceptance of the legality of the intervention, although at various 
times there was criticism of the conduct of the operation. 
D. Rwanda 
In 1994, Rwanda was the site of one of the worst massacres of this century. 
Long-standing rivalry between Hutu and Tutsi tribes erupted into chaos 
after the death of the Rwandan President in a plane crash.69 Hutu extremists 
took control of the government and incited violence against Tutsi and 
moderate Hutu alike. Militia, paramilitary groups and gangs of Hutu youths 
went on killing sprees using machete, panga (machete-like weapons) and 
sharpened sticks. Tutsi responded in kind and the Hutu government military 
forces were re-engaged by the Tutsi-led rebel Rwandan Patriotic Front 
(RPF).70 By midsummer 1994 UN estimates of the number dead stood at 
500,000, ICRC estimates put the figure closer to one million. Ugandan 
officials reported that as many as 10,000 bodies had floated down the Kagera 
River into Lake Victoria. 
68 Murphy above n40, 240. 
69 The cause of the plane crash is debated. Hutu militants claimed the plane was shot down 
by Tutsi rebels, however the Tutsi rebels denied this and said that Hutu extremists had 
downed the plane themselves out of disgust for the Moderate Hutu Presidents stance 
toward the Tutsi. 
70 Murphy above n40, 244. 
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At the outset of the fighting it became clear that the small UN force already 
in Rwanda was incapable of curbing the escalating violence. Despite calls 
from the UN Commander on the ground for more troops, after increasing the 
mission's mandate, the Security Council elected instead to reduce the 
number of troops present in the area. Senior UN officials have confirmed that 
this was in large part due to United States pressure and the strength of their 
position in the Security Council.71 As the violence continued, television 
footage of rivers and waterfalls choked with mutilated bodies floating to 
Lake Victoria shocked the world into a public outcry demanding action. The 
Security Council responded to the demand and approved intervention. The 
US, still opposed to the intervention, questioned all UN steps with regard to 
the conflict, slowing the response to the situation playing out in Rwanda. 
On April 29, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali urged the 
deployment of additional African peacekeeping forces to protect and assist 
refugees and aid workers. The US strongly resisted this move in the Security 
Council, pointing out that despite the Secretary General's best efforts, no 
state had made a firm offer to send their forces to Rwanda and that the 
Rwandan factions had not given unconditional consent to the UN 
operation.72 By May 17 several member states and the growing tide of public 
opinion in the face of graphic media footage compelled the US to drop some 
of its objections and allow the Security Council to authorize 500 more 
Ghanaian Peacekeepers with the expectation of more to follow. 73 A total of 
5,500 soldiers were authorized on June 8 by Resolution 925,74 however lack of 
resources and the lack of familiarity with the military hardware supplied 
resulted in additional delays in deployment. 
On June 15 the French Government announced that it was prepared to 
intervene in the situation, and declared that there was a "real duty to 
71 "US Inertia on Rwanda part of Policy" The Dominion March 27, 1998. 
n Murphy above n40, 245. 
73 SC Res 918 UN SCOR 49th Sess 3377th mtg, UN Doc S/ RES/ 918 (1994). 
74 SC Res 925 UN SCOR 49th Sess 33881h mtg, UN Doc S/RES/ 925 (1994); Murphy above n40, 
246. 
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intervene in Rwanda".75 Although initially France had expected to have 
support from its main European and African allies, it soon became apparent 
that they would be acting alone. By June 21, a thousand French troops were 
positioned in what was then Zaire and the Central African Republic, 
however the French foreign minister asserted "we will do nothing without a 
UN green light".76 On June 22 the Security Council passed Resolution 929 
authorizing France to use "all necessary means" to protect "displaced 
persons, refugees and civilians at risk in Rwanda" .77 The preamble to the 
resolution stressed the strictly humanitarian character of the operation which 
"shall be conducted in an impartial and neutral fashion and shall not 
constitute an interposition force between the parties".78 Even before the 
French intervention, the Security Council declared the civil strife in Rwanda 
a threat to the peace, and had done so with emphasis more on the slaughter 
of Rwandan nationals than on their flight into neighboring countries.79 
Rwanda suffered, in large part, from occuring only six months after the UN 
intervention in Somalia. Following the tragic killing of 18 US Rangers in the 
failed attempt to capture Mohammed Aideed, the US congress lost its 
stomach for United Nations humanitarian intervention, adopting a policy 
change only days after the ambush. In a speech to the General Assembly, 
President Clinton declared that the "UN simply cannot become engaged in 
every one of the world's conflicts. If the American people are to say yes to 
UN peacekeeping, the UN must learn to say no". As the bloodshed began on 
April 6 1994, this 'learn to say no' policy was rapidly being implemented into 
official US policy by the finalization of Presidential Decision Directive 25 
(PDD25).80 
75 Murphy above n40, 248. 
76 Murphy above n40, 249. 
77 SC Res 929 UN SCOR 49th Sess 3392nct mtg, UN Doc S/ RES/929 (1994). 
78 The specific mention of the need for impartiality was to address scepticism from some 
member states that France would favour the Hutu factions. France had been responsible for 
arming and training the previous Hutu government forces. 
79 SC Res 918 UN SCOR 49th Sess 3377th mtg, UN Doc S/ RES/ 918 (1994); Murphy above n40, 
257. 
80 The US, still reeling from casualties in the UN operation in Somalia, was putting the 
finishing touches on Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25). PDD25 stipulates stringent 
E. Haiti 
In December 1990, Jean-Bertrand Aristide was elected president of Haiti after 
decades of dictatorial rule. A radical reformist, Aristide alienated the 
economic and military elites of the country and less than eight months after 
the internationally supervised elections in which he gained a 67 percent 
majority, he was ousted in a coup led by the leaders of the armed forces and 
police force. 
The Organization of American States (OAS) responded quickly, formally 
condemning the coup and recommending that its members impose economic 
and diplomatic sanctions against Haiti. While the UN Security Council met 
twice on the matter, they failed to adopt a resolution denouncing the coup, 
although all members separately denounced it and expressed strong support 
of the OAS action. This inaction was purportedly because China and certain 
non-aligned states were concerned about increasing involvement in matters 
traditionally considered within a state's domestic jurisdiction.81 
The General Assembly addressed the situation and strongly condemned the 
coup stressing that any entity resulting from the coup would be 
unacceptable. 82 
In June 1993 the defacto military leaders of Haiti had still refused to reinstate 
President Aristide and his government and the Security Council finally 
adopted coercive measures. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the 
Council imposed economic sanctions against Haiti and affirmed that the 
solution on the island should "take into account the above mentioned 
standards and guidelines regarding US support for UN peacekeeping missions with or 
without US troop participation. It is also clear that President Clinton banned State 
Department officials from calling the situation developing in Rwanda a 'genocide' despite 
evidence that the killings in Rwanda were well organised, planned and on a massive scale. 
President Clinton finally signed PDD25 on 3 May 1994. 
81 Tes6n, 355: UN SCOR 46th Sess 3011th mtg UN DOC S/ PV.3011 (1991) . 
82 GA Res 7, UN GAOR 461h sess, Agenda item 145, UN Doc A/RES/46/7 (1991). 
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resolutions of the Organization of American States and the General 
Assembly of the United Nations" ie the restoration of democracy in Haiti.83 
The Governors Island agreement was signed in July 1993 by the military 
junta which agreed to return Aristide to the presidency under democratic 
rule, and the sanctions against Haiti were subsequently lifted. However 
violence erupted again on the island in September 1993 and the agreement 
collapsed. The Security Council reestablished economic sanctions,84 and 
authorized member states to use military force to enforce them.85 
On July 311994, the Security Council adopted Resolution 940 that authorized 
member states "to form a multinational force [and] ... to use all necessary 
means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military leadership".86 The 
resolution provides: 
"Gravely concerned by the significant further deterioration of the 
humanitarian situation in Haiti, in particular the continuing 
escalation by the illegal de facto regime of systematic violations of 
civil liberties, the desperate plight of Haitian refugees and the recent 
expulsion of the staff of the International Civilian Mission 
(MICIVIH), which was condemned in its Presidential statement of 12 
July 1994(S/PRST /1994/32), 
Determining that the situation in Haiti continues to constitute a 
threat to peace and security in the region, 
4. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
authorises Member States to form a multinational force under 
unified command and control and, in this framework, to use all 
necessary means to facilitate the departure from Haiti of the military 
leadership, consistent with the Governors Island Agreement, the 
prompt return of the legitimately elected President and the 
restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, 
and to establish and maintain a secure and stable environment that 
83 Tes6n above n3, 356. 
84 SC Res 873, UN SCOR 43th Sess 3291st mtg, UN Doc S/RES/873 (1993). 
85 SC Res 875, UN SCOR 43thSess 3293rd mtg, UN Doc S/RES/875 (1993). 
86 Tes6n above n3, 35; SC Res 940, UN SCOR 49th Sess 3413th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/940 (1994). 
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will permit implementation of the Governors Island Agreement, on 
the understanding that the cost of implementing this temporary 
operation will be borne by the participating Member States;"87 
The United States and other member states threatened the military junta 
indicating that military invasion was a near certainty. A team of US 
Diplomats led by former president Jimmy Carter persuaded the leadership to 
agree to surrender power to Aristide and leave the country. This agreement 
was reached only hours before the invasion forces landed in Haiti.ss 
International reaction was almost universally positive to the agreement 
brokered by Carter and the subsequent US occupation. 
V. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AS A SEPARATE 
AUTHORIZATION. 
None of the interventions since the end of the cold war have relied solely on 
a doctrine of humanitarian intervention as a justification for intervention. 
These resolutions indicate that the Security Council's favoured formula for 
justifying any intervention on humanitarian grounds is to draw a link 
between massive human suffering and international peace and security and 
then authorize an operation to deliver humanitarian relief.s9 
In Iraq, the consequences of human rights violations that is, the massive flow 
of refugees towards international frontiers, was determined to pose a threat 
to international peace and security. 
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the international community generally failed to take 
forceful action even in the face of demonstrated genocide. Hundreds of 
thousands died and over two million refugees were displaced. For three 
years after the discovery of genocide, the NATO attacks were limited until 
the spring of 1995 when NATO expanded its airstrikes and forced the Serbs 
to negotiate an end to the war. 
87 SC Res. 940, UN SCOR 49t1, Sess 3413th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/940 (1994). 
88 Tes6n above n3, 357. 
89 Diane Orentlicher "Should We Risk Lives to Save Lives" (1993) 18(6) Boston Review. 
<http: / / bostonreview.mit.edu / BR18.6 / risklives.htrnl>. 
Here again humanitarian concerns were perceived as being important and 
within the mandate of the UN Security Council. At the same time, these 
concerns were "forced into the rubric of 'international peace and security' 
rather than standing on their own as justifications for UN action".90 Somalia, 
Rwanda and Haiti were likewise classified as threats to peace and security. 
While humanitarian intervention has not been recognized as a justification in 
its own right, it is clear that the international community has accepted a right 
to intervene in situations of mass violations of human rights, in particular the 
right to life, will take precedence over state sovereignty. 
Some anti-interventionists have argued that because the UN Security Council 
has been selective about intervening in situations where humanitarian 
emergencies exist, it cannot mean that they believe they have the right to act. 
However, it must be understood that there are limits to the capability of any 
nation, group of nations or international organization to intervene. No one 
entity can address every crisis and the international community must 
employ a certain selectivity in addressing humanitarian crises.91 Such 
selectivity reflects lack of resources and logistical shortfall rather than lack of 
a mandate.92 
Campbell suggests that decisions about intervention should be made on the 
basis of criminal human intent. "The worst cases - those involving genocide -
must be taken up first". While it seems likely that members of the 
international community will continue to support intervention in situations 
that affect their vital interests, it cannot be allowed to detract from those 
90 Sovereignty Eclipsed above nl6. 
91 Campbell above n21. 
92 Thomas J Dolan "What difference if any, Will the United Nations Play in the Maintainance 
of International Peace and Security over the Next Fifty Years" (1996] 2 J Int'l & Comp L & 
Int'l Prac Notebook, 
<http: / / www.nsulaw.nova.edu / pubs / journal/vol2_3/3%20dolontext.htm1> (last accessed 
30 September 1998). 
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situations which demand intervention, by their very nature. The world, for 
the moment at least, must take what it can get.93 
93 Glenn Ware "The emerging norm of Humanitarian Intervention and Presidential Directive 
25" [1997] 44 Naval L Rev 1, [Ware]. 
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PART TWO 
If Rights don't reqitire us to intervene ... then it is difficult to see why they 
should be called rights94 
Part one of the paper has shown that the international community has 
established a right to intervene in situations of widespread human rights 
violations, in particular genocide. The current part investigates the idea that 
this right is in fact, a legal duty to intervene and investigates the 
consequences of this duty. Where there is a duty there must be a 
corresponding right. In this case humanity's inherent right to life is the most 
cogent choice.95 This paper shows that the legal duty is established through 
the interplay between the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide 1948 (Genocide Convention) and the Charter of the 
United Nations. As both of these treaties have assumed the status of 
customary international law, it may be argued that the duty to intervene is 
also established in customary law. Further, it will be shown that the existence 
of this duty is reinforced by the general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations. 
VI. A DUTY TO ACT 
The Genocide Convention establishes a duty on states to prevent and punish 
the crime of genocide.96 Article 1 of the convention confirms genocide as "a 
crime under international law which States undertake to prevent and 
punish". Further, Article 8 provides that "any contracting party may call 
upon the competent organs of the United Nations to take such action under 
the Charter of the United Nations as they consider appropriate for the 
94 Micheal Walzer "The Moral Standing of States: A Response to Four Critics" (1980] 9 Phil & 
Pub Aff. 223 cited in Sovereignty Eclipsed. 
95 Could also springboard off the right to live peacefully in ones homeland, or the right to 
not be discriminated against for reasons of race, religion. 
% Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948 UNTS 
No.1021, Vol 78 (1951), 277 [Genocide Convention]. 
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prevention and suppression of acts of genocide".97 The Genocide Convention 
was adopted unanimously by the General Assembly on December 9, 1948 
and entered into force on January 13, 1951 as such it may be considered as 
international customary law.98• 
There is no doubt that Article 1 of the Genocide Convention imposes a duty 
on the contracting parties.99 Originally, the duty to act was included in the 
final paragraph of the preamble to the Convention. However, during the 
proceedings of the sixth committee, the Belgian representative proposed that 
it should be incorporated into Article 1 to strengthen the obligation to 
prevent and punish the crime of genocide.100 He explained" the Belgian 
proposal was to substitute for a purely declaratory statement a solemn 
commitment, of practical import, to prevent and suppress the crime".101 
Further, the US representative noted "if a lawyer had to rely on the preamble 
... he would have a more difficult task in court than if that statement were 
laid down in the operative part of the convention".102 Thus it can be seen that 
not only does Article 1 impose a duty on states; consideration was also given 
to the consequences of a breach of that duty and its enforcement. Indeed, US 
President Bill Clinton banned his state department officials from calling the 
\ 
situation in Rwanda 'genocide' lest the United States be called upon to fulfill / 
an international legal obligation to intervene.103 
Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations confers on the Security 
Council the 'primary responsibility' for 'maintaining and restoring 
international peace and security'. The language of the article establishes the 
primacy of the Council for all actions within that definition. Part one has 
shown that the practice of the Security Council since the end of the Cold War 
97 Genocide Convention above n96. 
98 Genocide Convention above n96. 
99 Draft Convention and Report of the Economic and Social Council, Report of the Sixth 
Committee, UN GAOR, 3d Sess, pmbl., at 9, U.N. Doc. A/760 (1948), [Sixth Committee 
Report]. 
100 Sixth Committee Report above n99. 
101 Sixth Committee Report above n99, 44. 
102 Sixth Committee Report above n99, 50. 
103 "French Clique Blamed in Rwanda Massacre" The Dominion Friday 1 May 1998. 
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has established a wide reading of the concept of 'threat to international 
peace and security'. The concept has been used to incorporate mass flows of 
refugees, starvation, widespread human rights violations and 'ethnic 
cleansing' or genocide. By including genocide in the expanded definition of 
threat to international peace and security, the Security Council has placed it 
within the class of actions over which it has primary responsibility. 
Article 24(2) also confirms that States agree that the Security Council will act 
on its behalf when exercising this responsibility. It thus follows that the 
Security Council has a duty to act on behalf of states and undertakes to 
prevent, suppress and punish genocide on their behalf. States likewise agree 
that in this regard the Security Council acts on their behalf,104 and agree to 
accept and carry out their decisions. 105 
A further argument suggests that the international community has allowed 
and supported collective humanitarian interventions in situations of 
genocide, indeed support for all of the interventions outlined above was 
almost unanimous. Further, it has accepted the Security Council's decision to 
class them as threats to international peace and security.106 It may be 
contended that this is an implicit referral of all situations of genocide to the 
"competent organ of the United Nations" for "prevention and suppression" 
under Article 8 of the Genocide Convention. 
Sean Murphy has argued that a duty to intervene in humanitarian crises 
cannot exist in international law in the present world system. He advances 
his argument by commenting that although the duty to rescue exists in many 
international jurisdictions, it does not exist in all of them. Further, he points 
out, a duty will not be found absent a special relationship between rescuer 
and rescuee. Murphy's analysis is flawed in several respects. Firstly, the 
104 Article 24(2) UN Charter. 
105 Article 25 UN Charter. 
106 An exception to this statement is China's steadfast refusal any attempt to classify 
intrastate conflicts, regardless of the magnitude of human suffering, as threats to 
international peace and security. They maintain that these are internal matters, and 






analysis rests on the duty of a civilian passerby to rescue another civilian. 
This analogy is inappropriate when dealing with the Security Council of the 
United Nations. An almost universal duty exists for authorized security 
personnel, for example police or fire officers, to protect the population they 
serve. 
The Genocide Convention defines genocide as acts committed with the intent 
to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.107 
A set 'body-count' is inappropriate in circumstances such as these but it 
seems that intention provides the key. The United States representative on 
the Ad Hoe Committee explained that "the intention was the important 
factor and the destruction of a fraction of the group would constitute 
genocide provided that the intention was to destroy the group totally".108 
Because the Security Council does not usually become seized of a matter 
before it develops into a major conflagration, the duty to prevent genocide 
will often be restricted to situations where conflict already exists. However, 
there may be some circumstances where the United Nations becomes aware 
of a situation before it eventuates. For example, in Rwanda, there is evidence 
that the United Nations knew of the plan to commit genocide but that 
somehow it got lost in the bureaucracy.109 If this were the case then the 
Security Council would have a duty to prevent the genocide from ever 
107 In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, etlmical [sic], racial or religious group, as 
such: 
(a) Killing members of the group; 
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to anothey group. 
108 UN ESCOR Ad Hoe Comm on Genocide, 6th Sess, 13th mtg, 6; E/ AC.25/SR.13 (1948) 
cited in Matthew Lippman "The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Genocide: Forty-five Years Later" [1994] 8 Temp Int'l & Comp LJ 1, 24. 
109 "UN was warned of Rwanda Genocide, Newspaper Says" Reuters [Online], November 25 
1995, cited in Soveriegnty Eclipsed above n16. 
taking place. In that circumstance the situation may have been able to be 
resolved without force (hence gaining United States approval) and without 
the associated impact of mass refugee flows across borders into neighboring 
states. 
VII. PROXIMITY AND RISK 
Murphy voiced further objections that the duty to rescue in domestic 
jurisdictions requires the proximity of the rescuer to the rescuee. He argues 
that because humanitarian interventions often require force to be sent from 
half way round the globe they cannot meet this criterion. This argument fails 
to recognize the role of domestic law as a source of international law. 
General principles of domestic law are often considered as supplements to 
customary international law. Further, the travaux prepatories of Article 38 of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice -indicate that domestic law 
should only be applied internationally "if it seems appropriate in the 
different context of inter-state relations". The idea of proximity in the sense 
that is meant in the domestic duty to rescue is not one that translates easily to 
the domain of states or international organizations. 
Consequently, any element of proximity must be reinterpreted for the 
international arena. In this respect a few points should be mentioned. 
Firstly, the nature of humanitarian emergencies means that more time is 
available. They last for weeks rather than a one off event. Genocide in 
particular usually happens over a period of time. Even in Rwanda, where the 
Hutu extremists did their work five times faster than the mechanized gas 
chambers of the Nazi party during the Holocaust,110 the killing happened 
over a period of three months. In domestic law, the duty to rescue is usually 
applied to one off events, happening over a matter of hours or perhaps days 
rather than weeks or months, therefore the proximity of the rescuer is more 
crucial to the matter of rescue. 
110 Genocide Survivors above nl. 
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Secondly, in this era of advanced technology, troop mobilization can happen 
very quickly once the decision to act has been taken. For example, France 
was in Rwanda within three days of receiving Security Council 
authorization. Given the greater time frame available for intervention on an 
international level, the short time that it takes to transport troops, once 
prepared,111 again lessens the need for proximity. 
A further point that must be made is that often it is those who are proximate 
to the crisis who provide assistance or are the instigators of UN action. For 
example, ECOWAS was the major intervenor in Liberia; Ghanaian UN 
troops assisted France in Rwanda; NATO in Bosnia etc. When Iraqi Kurds 
fled across borders to escape the government troops it was Turkey and Iran, 
both neighboring states who demanded action from the United Nations. 
Finally, the influence of the United Nations is everywhere. While the 
headquarters may be in New York and Geneva, it is a global organization 
and therefore present where ever a member state is. Further, the United 
Nations has no standing force of its own and therefore must draw on 
personnel and equipment from around the globe. Arguing that the United 
Nations is not proximate presupposes the composition of the intervening 
force in any given situation. Given the past composition of intervention 
forces, usually based on proximity and ties to a particular region, it cannot be 
argued that the United Nations is not proximate in a sense that works in the 
international arena. 
Murphy further comments that in domestic law a common requirement of 
those jurisdictions containing the duty to rescue, charges that the rescue 
must be able to be conducted with minimal risk of harm to the rescuer. He 
points out that humanitarian interventions pose a "substantial risk of death 
and danger to the intervening forces". 112 Again, this presupposes a civilian 
rescuer. There remains an almost universal duty on security personnel to 
m The UN mission supporting the French operation in Rwanda took a long time to be 
organised as The African troops were unfamiliar with some western weaponry. The time 
taken in matching the UN troops to weapons they were familiar slowed down the UN troop 
deployment significantly. 
112 Murphy above n40, 296. 
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rescue civilians. Police have a duty to rescue people in trouble, as do Fire 
Officers when passing a fire. We expect these people to risk their lives to save 
others because that is their job. If UN troops are at risk, while we may fear 
for their safety and minimise the risk to which they are exposed, we must 
accept that death is part of the risk of their jobs. They are soldiers; their job is , 
to go into the line of fire to protect others. General Douglas McArthur made 
the same point in 1946 when he said: 
"The soldier, be he friend or foe, is charged with the protection of the 
weak and unarmed. It is the very essence and reason for his being. 
When he violates heis sacred trust, he not only profanes his entire 
cult but threatens ~ very fabric of international society. The 
' 
traditions of fighting men are long and honorable. They are based 
/ 
upon the nobelest of human traits - sacrifice!" 
/ 
While any intervention in a conflict must carry some element of danger, the 
question becomes how much risk is acceptable. The standard will differ for 
every Member State who contributes troops to a particular intervention, each 
must assess and determine what level of risk they will expose their troops 
to. 113 This brings us closer to the idea that member states should have forces 
specifically designated for UN engagements, perhaps as a double volunteer 
force, that is, volunteer for duty for your country and furthe volunteer for 
service to the UN. .../ 
The risk of danger in conflict situations is related to three main factors, 
military strength, conflict volatility and realistic conflict/ response analysis. 
That is, the least risk will be posed when an intervention occurs at the right 
time, with sufficient troops and equipment, of the right type and with clear 
goals. 
113 One US soldier is currently appealing a court-martial for refusing to serve in a UN force. 
His response was 'I am a US soldier not a UN soldie~',)1e was convict d, Jowever if his 
appeal is successful it may be that establishing units/corps of troops who have specifically 
volunteered for United Nations duty is the answer. 
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Conflict volatility. Most humanitarian interventions since the end of the Cold 
War have occurred at the last possible moment. Early intervention in a 
conflict reduces the risk to UN personnel and requires fewer resources than a 
later intervention. In Rwanda the UN commander on the ground General 
Dalliare pointed out that they could have saved hundreds of thousands of 
lives had the UN acted immediately with as few as 5000 troops. 114 In the case 
of Rwanda, the French intervention was authorized only after several 
member states had prevailed on the United States to withhold its objections. 
The acceptance of a duty to act to prevent genocide may curtail such 
objections. Allowing intervention earlier lowers the level of conflict volatility 
troops are exposed to. 
Military Strength. "Peace enforcement requires very different forces 
qualitatively and quantitatively than does peacekeeping. The result of 
confusing roles and forces has been most evident in the placing of the 
UNPROFOR peacekeepers in a war zone in Sarejevo, where the peacekeepers 
were placed in a peace enforcement situation and have proven -
unsurprisingly - not to be up to a task for which they are unprepared". 115 As 
well as having the correct type of troops for an intervention, it is important 
that they have enough troops with enough equipment. One commentator has 
pointed out that when genocide threatens only "complete invasion and 
occupation is likely to stop the crime".116 When the French intervened in 
Rwanda, they limited their mission to establishing a safe haven in the south-
west of the country. The Commander quite bluntly stated "we only got 
hundreds of people here, and there are hundreds of thousands who need 
help, we cannot evacuate everybody".117 
11 4 Ware above n93, 39. 
115 Donald Snow "Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace Enforcement: The US Role in the 
New International Order 1993 US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 
<http: //carlisle-www.army.mil/ usassi / ssipubs / pubs93e/ peackeep / peckepss.htm> 19. 
116 Barry Posen "Military Responses to Refugee Disasters" cited in Ware above n93, 51. 
117 R Bonner "Tutsi Refugees Reported Trapped in Rwanda" NY Times, June 30 1994, slat 5, 
cited in Murphy above n40, 252. 
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Clear Objectives. General John Mclnnis asserts that a force can only carry out 
the tasks for which it is trained and equipped. Anytime that mission "creeps" 
away from the original intent, then the effect will bring the mission to a 
standstill.118 The intervention in Somalia is a case in point. The original goals 
in Somalia were to provide assistance to the relief agencies working there. 
When the UN increased the mission's mandate to include 'nation-building' 
activities, they came under direct attack from the fighting factions and many 
UN and supporting personnel lost their lives. In comparison, the 
intervention in Rwanda by French forces had strict mission parameters from 
which the French refused to be drawn. As a result, the mission was 
successful. 
It is within these bounds that the assessment of risk must be made. If the UN 
increases the risks associated with of intervention by its own actions or the 
actions of its member states, surely it cannot be used to negate a duty to 
intervene. 
VIII. CONSEQUENCES 
While accepting that this is a controversial area, it seems that international 
law has evolved to a position where the Security Council may have a duty to 
intervene in defence of humanity. If it is accepted that the law has indeed 
reached this point, there must be consequences for failure to act in a situation 
where it had a duty to do so. This section contemplates what these 
consequences might be, and the effect on the international community of 
finding that there is a duty. 
The duty established by the Genocide Convention and Article 24 of the 
Charter is to prevent, suppress and punish genocide. Therefore, a breach of 
that duty will be the failure of the Security Council to prevent, suppress or 
punish genocide. 119 However the question of what will constitute a breach is 
118 John Mclrmis "Peacekeeping and Post-modern Conflict: A Soldiers View [1995] 
Mediterranean Q, 36, cited in Ware above n93, 21. 
119 As far as pW1ishment of genocide is concerned the Security Council has established War 
Crimes tribunals in both Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia to investigate and prosecute 
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more complex. Will complete inaction be the only breach, or will it be 
sufficent that the Security Council has not adopted all possible measures to 
suppress the crime? 
The United Nations may act in ways that seek to end the conflict but do not 
entail the use of force. Indeed, Article 42 requires that the Security Council 
have established that non-forceful measures are, or will be, ineffective. While 
several commentators have argued that the only effective way to end 
genocide is by comprehensive military action.120 However, if the Security 
Council adopts non-forceful measures even after it appear that the time for 
them has passed, and as a result several thousand lives are lost before they 
authorise military intervention, will the Security Council be liable to the 
victim state for those lives? This would seem to encourage the use of force at 
the outset, which, although some commentators WO'Jld argue was 
appropriate, goes against the UN ideal of pacific settlement of disputes and 
preferred attempts to mediate and negotiate conclusions to conflict. Further, 
establishing liability on the Security Council for those deaths would militate 
against the principle of necessity. In Common Law jurisdictions at least, the 
police do not have a duty to the victim of a serial murderer for the failure to 
arrest the culprit before they have committed another murder.121 However, 
the question of whether they owed a duty to a person at special, distinctive 
risk from criminality has been left open. At first glance it would appear that 
genocide, where a particular ethnic or religious group are at special risk, 
would fit this category. However, the leading case on the topic held that the 
class of 'all young women' was too large to create a duty, it would appear 
that an entire ethnic group would also be too large, even allowing for the 
transition to an international law environment. 
perpetrators of crimes under the Genocide Convention and other international documents. 
The Rome Statute establishing an International Criminal Court was adopted on 17 July 1998 
in an unrecorded vote of 120:7:21. The International Criminal Court was established to deal 
specifically with genocide and crimes against humanity. UN Doc A/CONF 183/9. 
120 Campbell above n21 para 3, Posen in Ware above n93, 51. 
121 Hill v West Yorkshire Police [1989] AC 53. The House of Lords concluded that the police 
could not be expected to protect all young women in the West Yorkshire area of England 
from the attacks of a murderer, because there was no suficent relationship between the 
potential victims. 
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However, forcible interventions by the United Nations under UN command 
are not the only course of action open to the Security Council. In fact, 
Somalia remains the only instance where United Nations troops have 
intervened in a country with an express mandate to use 'all necessary means' 
for humanitarian ends. The United Nations has preferred to authorize 
interventions under the auspices of a member state. This solves the 
'command and control' issues for the large states contributing troops to the 
interventions. However, smaller states have expressed concern at the lack of 
UN involvement. In answer to their concerns the UN established command 
and control procedures for the intervention in Bosnia, however reports later 
showed that the split command concept was proving an obstruction to 
effective engagement by NATO forces. 122 
Leaving aside the thorny question of who may have jurisdiction over the 
Security Council, there remains the question of what p~n~lties ~he UN will 
make to the Victim State.123 Under the established rules of state 
responsibility, in the ILC draft articles, states make reparation or offer 
apologies for any act or omission that has caused harm. Damages may also 
be assessed for damage to dignity and other non-material damage.124 If there 
is a duty to act and the Security Council does not, for whatever reason, then 
reparation and/ or apologies must be made. It may be that Clinton's 
assumption of blame in Rwanda, rather than merely a political act, was a 
step toward that acknowledgement. 
If the United Nations must pay reparations to a victim state, will they be able 
to levy a particular Member State when the Security Council is prevented 
from acting by one of its own members? During the crisis in Rwanda, it is 
122 "Allies at Odds Prolonged Bloodshed" The Guardian 27 April 1996, cited in Tobias 
Vogel"The politics of Humanitarian Intervention" Jnl of Hum Ass <http://www-
jha.sps.cam.ac.uk/ a/a018 / htm> (posted 3 September 1996). 
123 The question of judging the legitimacy of Security Council decisions is a lengthy one that 
cannot be dealt with in the constraints of this paper. See generally, Jose Alvarez "Judging the 
Security Council" [1996) 90 AJIL l. 




widely acknowledged that the United States, still reeling from its unexpected 
losses in Somalia, played a large role in preventing the Security Council from 
acting to suppress the slaughter occuring. This was due, in large part, to the 
development of Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD25), implementing a 
'vital interests ' policy on intervention. The US, putting the final touches on 
PDD25, insisted that the UN reduce the troop numbers already stationed in 
Rwanda and refuse General Dallaire's request for more troops and an 
expanded mandate . One writer has dubbed this change in policy "Somalia 
Syndromei because of its obvious connection to the loss of 18 US Rangers in a 
botche~ raid during the Somalia intervention.125 
If one views the United Nations as a company, can we then 'pierce the 
corporate veil' and attach duty to individual member states, to facilitate 
Security Council intervention or at least not to prevent the Security Council 
from acting. Directors of companies can certainly be found liable where a 
company has been negligent; indeed a company is not presently capable of 
being found to have criminal intent. 
If this view is correct, surely the outcome of this will be to make all states 
support intervention lest they be held to be responsible for the deaths of 
millions. This altering of attitudes effectively takes away the right of veto, 
and endangers the very reason for its existence. The permanent five members 
of the Security Council were given the veto because they were the major 
powers at the time and it meant that they could not be bound by anything 
that adversely affected their interests. By making them liable for lack of 
action, it takes away this right and forces them into a situation of not only 
supporting the intervention but paying for it as well.126 
Surely this cannot be right. The legitimacy of the Security Council comes 
from the fact that membership comes from different backgrounds which are 
supposed to provide counterweight and prevent extremes in any direction. If 
125 Tom Ashbrook "UN efforts everywhere turn to dust; downed helicopter in Somalia 
Doomed a New World Order; Who Will keep the peace" Boston Globe, April 30 1995, 1. 
126 Approximately 1/3 of all UN peacekeeping cos ts are met by the United States. 
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a state can be held liable for blocking UN intervention that undermines this 
very basic and essential concept. 
For the people of Rwanda therefore, does it mean that the UN system with 
its panoply of rights and other instruments including the Charter and the 
Genocide Convention is always only there at the convenience of the Security 
Council system? 
IX. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of international law is to regulate internationally acceptable 
modes of behaviour between states. In 1948 the international community 
confirmed that genocide was an international crime and pledged themselves 
to the prevention, suppression and punishment of this ultimate crime against 
humanity. How much more so does this duty attach to the organisation, 
which has placed itself at the forefront of the fight to maintain and restore 
international peace and security and protect succeeding generations from the 
scourge of war. It makes no difference that the form of war has changed, 
indeed the change in methods of warfare, and the increased lack of 
discrimination between combatant and civilian, makes the UN's duty that 
much more salient. 
This paper has made it clear that the Security Council may be under a duty 
to intervene in situations of widespread human rights violations, in 
paticular, genocide. However, the scope and consequences of this duty 
remain unclear. It remains to be seen what the extent of the duty upon the 
Security Council is, however it is certain that total inaction, whether or not 
the Security Council is seized of the matter will incur liability. One matter 
which seems certain however, is that the international community will not be 
able to hold individual Member States liable for preventing the Security 
Council from acting, nor should they be able to. 
International law has reached a point in its progession where a duty of 
humanitarian intervention is possible. With the increasing globalization of 
the international community, the advanced technology heightening our 
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awareness of human tradgedy, the movement towards popular sovereignty, 
and the increased salience of non-colonial self-determination, we have 
converged on a point where the international legal community can act. We 
should not shrink from this opportunity to do so. 
It is often easy to lose sight of the big picture, however the last decade has 
seen two genocides to rival the killing camps of Nazi Germany.127 As I write 
this conclusion the Security Council has determined that the situation in 
Kosovo constitutes a threat to international peace and security. And again 
the international community girds its collective loins to intervene in defence 
of humanity. 
127 The killing fields of Cambodia are not officially classified as genocide, as the Genocide 
Convention makes no provision for the destruction of political groups (politicide). See 
generally, Beth Van Schaack "The Crime of Political Genocide: Repairing the Genocide 
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